Chapter 1

Identifications:

Mission Civilisatrice 
Ho Chi Minh
Vo Nguyen Giap
O.S.S.
Truman Doctrine
loss of China
Domino theory
Bao Dai
Battle of Cao Bang
Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG)
European Defense Community (EDC)
General Henri Navarre
Dien Bien Phu
Operation Vulture
United Action
Geneva Accords

Questions for consideration:

1	Why were the statements of Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap's statements on September 2, 1945 both informative and ironic?
	
2	What was the Vietnamese legacy of resistance to foreigners?
	
3	How did President Franklin Roosevelt view French colonialism in the region? How did his views change in the period immediately preceding his death?

4	How does the author critique the Truman administration's perceptions of the Vietminh?
	
5	Why was 1950 important for changing a localized anticolonial struggle into a major and increasingly dangerous theater in the emerging Cold War? Why and how did the United States become more prominently involved in the conflict?
	
6	How did the Cold War expand in Europe in the period, 1947-1950, and what effect did it have on the struggle in Indochina?
	
7	Why does the author argue that in 1950 American assessments of the situation in Vietnam was off the mark?
	
8	In late 1950, the United States committed more aid, both military, economic, and technical. What did it hope to gain from the French? Were its efforts effective?
	
9	How did the French view U.S. assistance in the period, 1950-1952?
	
10	What did leaders such as Rob McClintock and General J. Lawton Collins see as the sources of the French problems in defeating the Vietminh? What did the Eisenhower administration propose as a solution to the problems?
	

11	Why were Dulles and Eisenhower unwilling to commit U.S. forces to relieve the French at Dien Bien Phu? What role did Congress play? Why was the United Action plan a failure?
	

12	What were the "deep marks" that the Battle of Dien Bien Phu imposed on those involved?
	

13	How did the various parties view the Geneva Accords?
	



Chapter 2

Identifications:

Edward Lansdale
Ngo Dinh Diem
Passage to Freedom
The Sects Crisis
"national" referendum
International Rescue Committee (IRC)
American Friends of Vietnam (AFV)
Michigan State group
Commercial Import Program
National Liberation Front (NLF)
agroville program
Pathet Lao

Questions for consideration:

1	Why does the author argue that if the United States had looked all over the world that it "could not have chosen a less promising place for an experiment in nation building?"
	
2	What were some of the types of warnings issued regarding the "pitfalls of nation building?"
	
3	How did Ngo Dinh Diem become the U.S. choice for the position of premier?
	
4	What were the major U.S. efforts to build a national and internal security state in South Vietnam? What were the successes and failures in the process?
	
5	By the late 1950s, Senator Gale McGee proposed that South Vietnam be made a "showcase" for foreign aid programs? Was this a realistic appraisal according to the author?
	
6	Why does the author emphasize that "the massive infusion" of American aid kept South Vietnam alive and that it fostered its dependency?
	
7	Why does the author argue that "the basic problem of nation building was political?"
	
8	What were the origins of the insurgency in the South? What was the initial attitude of the North Vietnamese regarding the Viet Cong and how did it change over time?
	
9	Why does the author argue that the Eisenhower administration kept the Diem regime afloat for six years "through luck as much as anything else?"?
	




Chapter 3

Identifications:

Thich Quang Duc
Taylor-Rostow mission
strategic hamlet program
Project "Beef Up"
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV)
General Paul D. Harkins 
Battle of Ap Bac
John Kenneth Galbraith
David Halberstam
Mike Mansfield
Buddhist Crisis
Krulak-Mendenhall Mission
DeGaulle Plan of 1962
Souvanna Phouma
McNamara-Taylor Report

Questions for Consideration

1	How do you assess Kennedy's position on Vietnam prior to his presidency?
	
2	Why would the author argue that "Vietnam stands as the most tragic legacy of the global activism of the Kennedy era?"
	
3	Why did Kennedy refuse to place U.S. troops in Laos and seek a negotiated settlement instead but follow a different strategy in South Vietnam?
	
4	Why did the Kennedy administration have such a hard time forcing Diem to conform and make changes in 1961?
	
5	Why does the author argue "Kennedy's decisions in 1961 mark yet another critical turning point in American involvement in Vietnam?"
	
6	How did the Kennedy administration deceive the American public regarding the activities of U.S. "advisers" in 1962?
	
7	What were the challenges the ARVN faced even when backed by U.S. support? How did the Vietcong respond?
	
8	Why does the author note that "throughout 1962, Vietnam remained an operational rather than policy problem?"
	
9	How does the author view the interpretations of Roger Hilsman, Kenneth O'Donnell, and John Newman regarding their assertions that Kennedy would have withdrawn U.S. troops had he lived?
	
10	Why does the author assert that "the administration was not as innocent as some of its defenders maintained" regarding the coup against Diem?
	
11	What is the author's final appraisal of Kennedy's legacy in Vietnam?
	







Chapter 4

Identifications:

National Security Council Actions Memorandum (NASM) 273
General Ngyuen Khahn
National Security Council Actions Memorandum (NASM) 288
OPLAN 34A
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
Ernest Gruening
George Ball
Operation "Rolling Thunder"
"enclave strategy"
"Target: College Campuses"
General Nguyen Van Thieu
Clark Clifford
Bui Diem

Questions for consideration

1	What did President Johnson mean when he felt like a catfish that had just "grabbed a big juicy worm with a right sharp hook in the middle of it?"
	
2	What type of personality did President Johnson have and how did it affect his policymaking decisions?
	
3	Does the author believe that McNamara and Johnson purposely misled the Congress and the American people to secure the passage of the resolution?
	
4	According to the author, why did the Johnson administration choose war in late 1964?
	
5	Why was the approval of the air campaign in early December 1964 characterized as a "momentous decision?"
	
6	What were Maxwell Taylor's objections to Westmoreland's troop requests in early 1965? Why does the author characterize them as "prophetic?"
	
7	Why does the author argue, "Johnson thus took the nation into war by indirection and dissimulation?"
	
8	What were the “fateful decisions” President Johnson made in July 1965 that set “the United States on a course from which it would not deviate for nearly three years and opening the way for eight years of bloody warfare in Vietnam?”
	
9	Why does the author argue that "Johnson's middle course probably reflected the aspirations of the American public and Congress?"
	
10	According to the author, what were the "two fatal miscalculations on which the administration based its policies decisions in the first two years in office?"
	






Chapter 5

Identifications:

Strategy of attrition
"many flags" campaign
Agent Orange
Operation "Cedar Falls"
Honolulu Communiqué
Revolutionary Development Program 
"Fourteen Points"
J. William Fulbright
Howard Levy
San Antonio formula
Operation Chaos

Questions for Consideration:

1	What was the mindset of the Americans as represented by the statements of the journalists on the Ranger and Philip Caputo? How does it help explain how the Americans chose to prosecute the war?
	
2	Why does the author conclude that "the manner in which airpower was used in Vietnam virtually ensured that it would not achieve its objectives?"
	
3	How did the NLF and North Vietnamese benefit from Soviet and Chinese assistance? Were they puppets of the two major Communist superpowers?
	
4	How does the author assess the effectiveness of U.S. ground operations in the period, 1965-67? What were the "serious flaws" of the war of attrition that the author notes?
	
5	What were the successes and failures of the pacification program?
	
6	Why does the author emphasize that "progress in the critical areas of national building was thus even more limited than on the battlefield?"
	
7	Why does the author emphasize that "the steady expansion of the war spurred strong international and domestic pressures for negotiation, but the military stalemate produced an equally firm diplomatic impasse?"
	
8	Who made up the anti-war movement? Were they a homogenous group? If not, why not? What were their goals and methods?
	
9	Why does the author assert that the "public mood-tired, angry, and frustrated-posed perhaps a more serious threat to the administration than did the antiwar movement?"
	
10	What were the "increasingly sharp divisions within the government" by 1967?
	
11	Why does the author believe that "Johnson's decisions of 1967, even more than those of 1965, defied military logic and did not face, much less resolve, the contradictions in strategy?"
	






Chapter 6

Identifications:

Wheeler Report
Clifford Task Force
Eugene McCarthy
Gold Crisis
March 31 Speech
Cheu Hoi Program
Phoenix Program
Operation Recovery
October Bombing Halt
Madame Anna Chennault
"battle of the tables"

Questions for consideration:

1	Do you agree with General Westmoreland's appraisal of the Tet Offensive?
	
2	Why would the author assert that if Tet was a "defeat for the enemy," it was still a very costly victory for the United States and South Vietnam?
	
3	Why did the Clifford Task Force reject Westmoreland's request? Instead what did Clifford recommend and why? What was Johnson's position on the recommendation?
	
4	According to the author, how did media attitudes and reporting change during Tet? What effect did it have?
	
5	How does the author respond to the charges of Westmoreland and others that the media "snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by turning the public against the war?"
	
6	According to the author, why was Johnsons speech on March 31 "in some ways a major turning point in U.S. involvement in Vietnam?"
	
7	Why does the author argue "[P]acification and Vietnamization were both long-range undertakings and the frenzied efforts of 1968 could not make up for years of neglect?"
	
8	Why does the author assert that "although it improved markedly in the aftermath of Tet, the performance of the government of South Vietnam remained at the best uneven, its stability uncertain?"
	
9	Why does the author believe "it seems doubtful that South Vietnamese intransigence sabotaged an opportunity for a peace settlement in 1968?"
	
10	Do you agree with the author that "Tet represented a major political victory for the enemy because it convinced most Americans that the war could not be won in an acceptable time and at an acceptable cost?"
	




Chapter 7

Identifications:

peace with honor
Operation MENU
protracted war strategy
silent majority speech
Moratoriums, Fall 1969
Lon Nol
Kent State University and Jackson State University
Cooper-Church Amendment
Hutson Plan
LAM SON 719
Winter Soldier hearings
William Calley
Pentagon Papers
Easter Offensive
jugular diplomacy
Paris Agreements

Questions for consideration:

1	Why was Kissinger’s statement, "we will not make the same old mistakes. We will make our own so enlightening?
	
2	Why does the author argue that "the Nixon-Kissinger strategy for ending the war was based on a large dose of wishful thinking?"
	
3	Why does the author assert that "on the surface, at least, the insurgency appeared to be under control" after the Vietnamization program was implemented fully in 1969? Yet, he also notes the weaknesses. What were they?
	
4	Why does the author argue that "Kissingers later claim that the United States intervened in Cambodia only hesitantly and belatedly" and only after being persuaded that the North Vietnamese were committed to the destruction of Lon Nols government appear at best misleading?
	
5	Why does the author argue, "although Nixon escaped with his power intact, the Cambodian venture tightened the trap he had set for himself?"
	
6	What was the administration's response to the groups and individuals such as the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, the Mayday Tribe, and Daniel Ellsberg?
	
7	Why does the author believe that the negotiations of late 1971 "were the most serious yet undertaken", but they "eventually broke down for the same reasons earlier efforts had failed?"
	
8	What were the responses to the Christmas Day bombings? Did the bombings, according to the author, produce a dramatically different result at the negotiating table?
	
9	Why does the author argue that "[]n fact, there was no peace... Nor was there honor?"
	



Chapter 8

Identifications:

POW/MIA issue
decent interval
War Powers Act
Operation "Frequent Wind"
Khmer Rouge
"model minority"
Vietnam Memorial
Powell Doctrine
"Vietmalia" syndrome
"Road Map"
Pete Peterson

Questions for consideration:

1	What undermined, according to the author, "Nixon's ability to dangle carrots or brandish sticks?"
	
2	Why does the author argue that overly optimistic French and U.S. officials had promised a light at the end of the tunnel, but "when the light finally appeared in 1975 it came with a stunning rapidity and brought an outcome that turned a cliche into a cruel irony?"
	
3	Why did the South Vietnamese government collapse so quickly? What was Washington's response?
	
4	Why does the author assert that the United States shared with the South Vietnamese leadership responsibility for the debacle of April 1975?
	
5	The author suggests that the fall of Saigon happened not only because of the weakness of South Vietnam and the errors of U.S. policymakers. What other factors help explain the outcome of the war in 1975?
	
6	Why does the author believe that "impact on world politics of Americas failure in Vietnam was considerably less than U.S. policy makers had predicted?"
	
7	According to the author, the principal legacy of the war in Vietnam was continued suffering in what ways?
	
8	Why does the author assert, even for the ostensible winners, victory was a bittersweet prize?
	
9	According the author, although the United States emerged physically unscathed, the Vietnam War was among the most debilitating in its history. Why?
	
10	Why does author believe the President George Bush, Sr.s statement of the end of the Persian Gulf War that "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all" was premature?
	
11	Even by 2003, the author argues that in the United States the wars influence did not entirely go away. Why?
	
12	Why does the author believe the ideological and cultural divides that had helped bring on the war in the first place and had made it so difficult to end still remained?
	







